CO129-507-3 China- anti-piracy precautions 31-10-1927 - 25-10-1928 — Page 124

132

18

and 17 sub-divisions, a fleet command with 3 main and 10 sub- commands, 4 independent inspectorates with 16 main and 37 sub-command and administrative centres, and a dockyard and arsenal with 14 main departments. "This artificially swollen super-organisation is conducted and steered by an Admiral, 3 Vice-Admirals, 10 Rear-Admirals, 180 Captains, 827 other officers and paymasters, 335 higher officials and 2,795 subordinate officials."

The guns, munitions, etc., demand extraordinary amounts, for which there is no satisfactory explanation.

The sums to be spent on experiments, £500,000, are out of all proportion to the requirements of the Navy, particularly the amounts to be allocated in connection with the design of Diesel engines. 'These experiments may be very interesting to certain gentlemen in the Navy, but it would be better to leave them to our industrial concerns, We have insufficient means to experiment for the benefit of other Navies."

The amounts proposed for new construction are, it is stated, phantastically high. For the construction of replacement ships £200 per ton is proposed (excluding, of course, armament). Before the war the cost of warships per ton was the same as that for luxury steamers; now it is to be four times greater. The estimated cost of armour shows an even greater increase on the pre-war standard. The 35,000 ton Nelson is understood to have cost £7,000,000. With this we must compare the estimated cost, £4,000,000 for the 10,000 ton replacement ship now de- manded, a vessel which even a layman will immediately realise will not represent an appreciable fraction of the fighting value of the Nelson.”

"

The attack in the Berliner Tageblatt produced a lengthy official reply from the head of the Estimates Section of the Marine Office, in which the main points in the article were either evaded or stated to be inaccurate. There was no real explanation of the very high estimates for new construction, though the absence of competitive tendering owing to treaty limitation on the number of armament firms makes armour definitely more expensive in Germany than elsewhere.

The official reply is, however, interesting in its references to future policy:-

<

Now let us turn to the last and most important point-the construction of new ships. As is known, the replacement of the completely out-of-date cruisers and torpedo boats is in full swing. One cruiser, the Emden is finished; the Karlsruhe and the Königsberg will follow in the budget year 1928; later cruiser 'D) ' about 1930; and then cruiser 'E'about 1931. That provides for five cruisers. This number must suffice for us, whether we like it or not, as crews cannot be provided for more than this number. As regards torpedo boats, 12 are being replaced by new construction, and the remaining 12 are being thoroughly over- hauled and brought up to date. Four of the new vessels are completed, and the others will follow in 1928 and 1929.

19

Now as regards the battleships. The six battleships, together with the two reserve vessels which the Peace Treaty allows us are completely obsolete and worn out. They have already well passed the accepted 20 years age limit, and the oldest, even if a replacement ship were laid down to-day, would be 30 years old before its withdrawal from service.

"(

*

*

EK

*

The absence of battleships would rob the German fighting forces of its backbone. It is difficult publicly to discuss the opera- tive tasks of a war fleet so that the lay mind can appreciate their importance; for the purpose of this article it will perhaps be sufficient to state that sea warfare concerns itself fundamentally with one object only the oversea trade and sea communications of the enemy. Modern sea warfare endeavours with every means to paralyse the enemy's commerce and to blockade his ways of communication. That signifies for Germany-who should still have the most unpleasant recollections of the effects of a war blockade, and 75 per cent. of whose foreign trade is at present conducted by sea-direct starvation and subjugation to foreign will, even in the case of a comparatively weak opponent, if she does not preserve her means of defending her own sea trade and sea communications. Cruisers alone are not sufficient for this purpose. Larger vessels with heavy armament and good speed are required, ships which are able to repulse light enemy forces and give cruisers and other lighter war craft sufficient support to enable them to carry out their tasks of convoying merchant ships and transport vessels. Further, the provision of a service- able, if small, fleet is a vital necessity for the preservation of neutrality. Sufficient proof of this should be given by a glance at the sea equipment of other second and third rate Powers, and at our own historical experiences of 1914-18 and 1864.

In addition, although it may not generally be realised, the German coast from Schleswig-Holstein to the Oder is completely unprotected. It offers, but for a strong floating defence, the most vulnerable points of attack. Connections with East Prussia in times of strite can only be secured by sea, and then only if powerful ships are at our disposal. This system of defence will collapse with the elimination of our battleships, if their replacement is not attended to.

"The designs of the Marineleitung avoid the construction of miniature battleships, with the inadequate displacement allowed us, and provide for a type of vessel which is heavily armed, moderately armoured and fast enough to escape from stronger forces. The Marineleitung believes it has evolved something really serviceable in its proposed designs, something which fully complies with the above requirements, and which will doubtless find due recognition, just as the cruiser replacements have done, in foreign countries.

The cost of the new vessels, which for want of a better name have been designated Armoured ships" (Panzerschiffe), has

66

133